The Regularity of the Value Function of Repeated Games with Switching Costs
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Tsodikovich, Yevgeny; Venel, Xavier; Zseleva, Anna
署名单位：
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Bar Ilan University; Luiss Guido Carli University; Maastricht University
刊物名称：
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0364-765X
DOI：
10.1287/moor.2022.1325
发表日期：
2023
页码：
1899-1905
关键词：
摘要：
We study repeated zero-sum games where one of the players pays a certain cost each time he changes his action. We derive the properties of the value and optimal strategies as a function of the ratio between the switching costs and the stage payoffs. In particular, the strategies exhibit a robustness property and typically do not change with a small perturbation of this ratio. Our analysis extends partially to the case where the players are limited to simpler strategies that are history independent-namely, static strategies. In this case, we also characterize the (minimax) value and the strategies for obtaining it.
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