Stochastic Games with General Payoff Functions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Flesch, Janos; Solan, Eilon
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.2023.1385
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1349-1371
• 关键词: Correlated equilibria; Determinacy; EXISTENCE

摘要

We consider multiplayer stochastic games with finitely many players and actions, and countably many states, in which the payoff of each player is a bounded and Borelmeasurable function of the infinite play. By using a generalization of the technique of Martin [Martin DA (1998) The determinacy of Blackwell games. J. Symb. Log. 63(4):1565-1581] and Maitra and Sudderth [Maitra A, Sudderth W (1998) Finitely additive stochastic games with Borel measurable payoffs. Internat. J. Game Theory 27:257-267], we show four different existence results. In each stochastic game, it holds for every & epsilon; > 0 that (i) each player has a strategy that guarantees in each subgame that this player's payoff is at least his or her maxmin value up to & epsilon;, (ii) there exists a strategy profile under which in each subgame each player's payoff is at least his or her minmax value up to & epsilon;, (iii) the game admits an extensive-form correlated & epsilon;-equilibrium, and (iv) there exists a subgame that admits an & epsilon;-equilibrium.