Constrained Information Design

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Doval, Laura; Skreta, Vasiliki
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.2022.1346
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Mechanism design

摘要

We provide tools to analyze information design problems subject to constraints. We do so by extending an insight by Le Treust and Tomala to the case of multiple inequality and equality constraints. Namely, that an information design problem subject to constraints can be represented as an unconstrained information design problem with additional states, one for each constraint. Thus, without loss of generality, optimal solutions induce as many posteriors as the number of states and constraints. We provide results that refine this upper bound. Furthermore, we provide conditions under which there is no duality gap in constrained information design, thus validating a Lagrangian approach. We illustrate our results with applications to mechanism design with limited commitment and persuasion of a privately informed receiver.