The Privacy Paradox and Optimal Bias-Variance Trade-offs in Data Acquisition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liao, Guocheng; Su, Yu; Ziani, Juba; Wierman, Adam; Huang, Jianwei
• 署名单位: Sun Yat Sen University; California Institute of Technology; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Shenzhen Institute of Artificial Intelligence & Robotics for Society
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.2023.0022
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 2749-2767
• 关键词: information; MARKETS; DESIGN

摘要

Whereas users claim to be concerned about privacy, often they do little to protect their privacy in their online actions. One prominent explanation for this privacy paradox is that, when an individual shares data, it is not just the individual's privacy that is compromised; the privacy of other individuals with correlated data is also compromised. This information leakage encourages oversharing of data and significantly impacts the incentives of individuals in online platforms. In this paper, we study the design of mechanisms for data acquisition in settings with information leakage and verifiable data. We design an incentive-compatible mechanism that optimizes the worst case trade-off between bias and variance of the estimation subject to a budget constraint, with which the worst case is over the unknown correlation between costs and data. Additionally, we characterize the structure of the optimal mechanism in closed form and study monotonicity and nonmonotonicity properties of the marketplace.