A Universally Efficient Dynamic Auction for All Unimodular Demand Types

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Fujishie, Satoru; Yang, Zaifu
• 署名单位: Kyoto University; University of York - UK
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0364-765X
• DOI: 10.1287/moor.2023.0127
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Vickrey auctions; competitive-equilibrium; gross substitutes; DESIGN; preferences; mechanisms; assignment; incentives; STABILITY; MARKETS

摘要

We propose a novel strategy-proof dynamic auction for efficiently allocating heterogeneous indivisible commodities. The auction applies to all unimodular demand types of Baldwin and Klemperer's necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of competitive equilibrium which accommodate a wide variety of complements, substitutes, gross substitutes and complements, and any other kinds. Although bidders are not assumed to be price takers so they can act strategically, this auction induces bidders to bid truthfully, yielding efficient outcomes. Sincere bidding is shown to be an ex post perfect Nash equilibrium of the auction. The trading rules are simple, detail free, privacy preserving, error tolerant, and independent of any probability distribution assumption.