Undisclosed SEC Investigations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blackburne, Terrence; Kepler, John D.; Quinn, Phillip J.; Taylor, Daniel
• 署名单位: Oregon State University; Stanford University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3805
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 3403-3418
• 关键词: SEC investigations; private information; managerial opportunism; Insider trading; accounting fraud

摘要

One of the hallmarks of the Security and Exchange Commision's (SEC's) investigative process is that it is shrouded in secrecy-only the SEC staff, high-level managers of the company being investigated, and outside counsel are typically aware of active investigations. We obtain novel data on all investigations closed by the SEC between 2000 and 2017-data that were heretofore nonpublic-and find that such investigations predict economically material declines in future firm performance. Despite evidence that the vast majority of these investigations are economically material, firms are not required to disclose them, and only 19% of investigations are initially disclosed. We examine whether corporate insiders exploit the undisclosed nature of these investigations for personal gain. Despite the undisclosed and economically material nature of these investigations, we find that insiders are not abstaining from trading. In particular, we find a pronounced spike in insider selling among undisclosed investigations with the most severe negative outcomes; and that abnormal selling activity appears highly opportunistic and earns significant abnormal returns. Our results suggest that SEC investigations are often undisclosed, economically material nonpublic events, and that insiders are trading in conjunction with these events.