Multiregional Oligopoly with Capacity Constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alsabah, Humoud; Bernard, Benjamin; Capponi, Agostino; Iyengar, Garud; Sethuramana, Jay
• 署名单位: Columbia University; National Taiwan University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3728
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 4789-4808
• 关键词: Coumot competition; oligopoly; networks; capacity constraints; Noncooperative games; welfare

摘要

We develop a model of Coumot competition between capacity-constrained firms that sell a single good to multiple regions. We provide a novel characterization for the unique equilibrium allocation of the good across regions and design an algorithm to compute it. We show that a reduction in transportation costs by a firm may negatively impact the profit of all firms and reduce aggregate consumer surplus if such a firm is capacity constrained. Our results imply that policies promoting free trade may have unintended consequences and reduce aggregate welfare in capacity-constrained industries.