Equilibria for networks with malicious users
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Karakostas, George; Viglas, Anastasios
署名单位：
University of Sydney; McMaster University
刊物名称：
MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
ISSN/ISSBN：
0025-5610
DOI：
10.1007/s10107-006-0015-2
发表日期：
2007
页码：
591-613
关键词：
摘要：
We consider the problem of characterizing user equilibria and optimal solutions for selfish routing in a given network. We extend the known models by considering malicious behavior. While selfish users follow a strategy that minimizes their individual cost, a malicious user will use his flow through the network in an effort to cause the maximum possible damage to the overall cost. We define a generalized model, present characterizations of flows at equilibrium and prove bounds for the ratio of the social cost of a flow at equilibrium over the cost when centralized coordination among users is allowed.