Loss-Framed Incentives and Employee (Mis-)Behavior

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Czibor, Eszter; Hsu, Danny; Jimenez-Gomez, David; Neckermann, Susanne; Subasi, Burcu
• 署名单位: University of Iceland; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Universitat d'Alacant; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4280
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 7518-7537
• 关键词: loss-framed incentives; multitasking; Incentive design; Stealing

摘要

This paper explores how loss-framed incentives affect behavior in a multitasking environment in which participants have more than one way of recovering (expected) losses. In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we offer participants task incentives that are framed as either a reward (gain) or penalty (loss). We study their responses along three dimensions: performance in the incentivized task, theft, and voluntary provision of help. We find that framing incentives as a penalty rather than as a reward does not significantly improve task performance, but it increases theft and leads to a small and insignificant reduction in the share of participants willing to help the experimenter. Secondary analyses based on our theoretical framework help us pin down the mechanism at play and suggest that loss aversion drives participants' response. Our findings have important implications for incentive design in practice.