Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate M&A Decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wu, Szu-Yin (Jennifer); Chung, Kee H.
• 署名单位: State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3934
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1378-1403
• 关键词: HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM; M&A performance; Schedule 13D filings; event study; ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS; corporate governance; selection bias

摘要

This paper shows that hedge fund activism is associated with a decrease in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and offer premiums and an increase in stock and operating performance. Activist hedge funds improve target firms' M&A performance by reducing poor M&A, diversifying M&A, and the M&A of firms with multiple business segments. Activist hedge funds improve target firms' M&A decisions by influencing their governance practices. We show that our results are unlikely driven by selection bias. Overall, activist hedge funds play an important role in the market for corporate control by increasing the efficiency of target firms' M&A activities through interventions.