Complex Disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jin, Ginger Zhe; Luca, Michael; Martin, Daniel
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4037
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 3236-3261
• 关键词: disclosure; complexity; experiments; naivete; overconfidence

摘要

We present evidence that unnecessarily complex disclosure can result from strategic incentives to shroud information. In our laboratory experiment, senders are required to report their private information truthfully but can choose how complex to make their reports. We find that senders use complex disclosure more than half the time. This obfuscation is profitable because receivers make systematic mistakes in assessing complex reports. Regression and structural analysis suggest that these mistakes could be driven by receivers who are naive about the strategic use of complexity or overconfident about their ability to process complex information.