Equilibrium, uncertainty and risk in hydro-thermal electricity systems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Philpott, Andy; Ferris, Michael; Wets, Roger
• 署名单位: University of Auckland; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of California System; University of California Davis
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-5610
• DOI: 10.1007/s10107-015-0972-4
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 483-513
• 关键词: coherent measures

摘要

The correspondence of competitive partial equilibrium with a social optimum is well documented in the welfare theorems of economics. These theorems can be applied to single-period electricity pool auctions in which price-taking agents maximize profits at competitive prices, and extend naturally to standard models with locational marginal prices. In hydro-thermal markets where the auctions are repeated over many periods, agents seek to optimize their current and future profit accounting for future prices that depend on uncertain inflows. This makes the agent problems multistage stochastic optimization models, but perfectly competitive partial equilibrium still corresponds to a social optimum when all agents are risk neutral and share common knowledge of the probability distribution governing future inflows. The situation is complicated when agents are risk averse. In this setting we show under mild conditions that a social optimum corresponds to a competitive market equilibrium if agents have time-consistent dynamic coherent risk measures and there are enough traded market instruments to hedge inflow uncertainty. We illustrate some of the consequences of risk aversion on market outcomes using a simple two-stage competitive equilibrium model with three agents.