Organizing Data Analytics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alonso, Ricardo; Camara, Odilon
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.00207
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Strategic experimentation; Bayesian persuasion; tampering; Organizational design; information technology; audit

摘要

We develop a theory of credible skepticism in organizations to explain the main tradeoffs in organizing data generation, analysis, and reporting. In our designer-agent principal game, the designer selects the information privately observed by the agent who can misreport it at a cost, whereas the principal can audit the report. We study three organizational levers: tampering prevention, tampering detection, and the allocation of the experimental-design task. We show that motivating informative experimentation while discouraging misreporting are often conflicting organizational goals. To incentivize experimentation, the principal foregoes a flawless tampering detection/prevention system and separates the tasks of experimental design and analysis.