Pick-an-Object Mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bo, Inacio; Hakimov, Rustamdjan
• 署名单位: Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4908
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 4693-4721
• 关键词: Market design; matching; Sequential mechanisms; experiments; Obvious strategy-proofness

摘要

We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may be rejected later on, and these agents are presented with new menus. When the procedure ends, agents are assigned the last object they picked. We characterize the allocation rules that can be sequentialized by PAO mechanisms and the ones that can be implemented in a robust truthful equilibrium. We justify the use of PAO as opposed to direct mechanisms by showing that its equilibrium behavior is closely related to the one in obviously strategy proof (OSP) mechanisms, but implements commonly used rules, such as Gale-Shapley DA and top trading cycles, which are not OSP implementable. We run laboratory experiments comparing truthful behavior when using PAO, OSP, and direct mechanisms to implement different rules. These indicate that agents are more likely to behave in line with the theoretical prediction under PAO and OSP implementations than their direct counterparts.