Dynamic Persuasion and Strategic Search

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yao, Yunfei (Jesse)
• 署名单位: Chinese University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.00994
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 6778-6803
• 关键词: Information provision; Bayesian persuasion; consumer search; game theory

摘要

Consumers frequently search for information before making decisions. Because their search and purchase decisions depend on the information environment, firms have a strong incentive to influence it. This paper endogenizes the consumer's information environment from the firm's perspective and endogenizes the search decision from the consumer's perspective. We consider a dynamic model where a firm sequentially persuades a consumer to purchase the product. The consumer only wishes to buy the product if it is a good match. The firm designs the information structure. Given the endogenous information environment, the consumer trades off the benefit and cost of information acquisition and decides whether to search for more information. Given the information acquisition strategy of the consumer, the firm trades off the benefit and cost of information provision and determines how much information to provide. This paper characterizes the optimal information structure under a general signal space. We find that the firm only smooths information provision over multiple periods if the consumer is optimistic about the product fit before searching for information. Moreover, if the search cost for the consumer is high, the firm designs the information such that the consumer will be certain that the product is a good match and will purchase it after observing a positive signal. If the search cost is low, the firm provides noisy information such that the consumer will be uncertain about the product fit but will still buy it after observing a positive signal.