Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Newman, Neil; Leyton-Brown, Kevin; Milgrom, Paul; Segal, Ilya
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.02489
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: incentive auction; deferred acceptance auction; reverse clock auction; spectrum auction; simulation; market design; auctions; Artificial intelligence; applied game theory

摘要

This paper revisits the descending clock reverse auction design used in the U.S. Federal Communications Commission's 2016-2017 incentive auction. We use extensive computational simulations to investigate the quantitative significance of various aspects of the design, leveraging a reverse auction simulator and realistic models of bidder values.