Organized Crime and Firms: Evidence from Antimafia Enforcement Actions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Slutzky, Pablo; Zeume, Stefan
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.00859
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 6569-6596
• 关键词: Organized crime; CORRUPTION; COMPETITION; money laundering

摘要

We exploit staggered municipality-level antimafia enforcement actions in Italy over the 1995-2015 period to study how the presence of organized crime affects firms. Following enforcement actions, we find increases in competition (i) among firms and (ii) for public procurement contracts. Firms that do not exit after a weakening of organized crime shrink in size, more so when operating in the nontradable sector. Our findings are consistent with organized crime acting as a barrier to entry and affecting local economic activity.