Voting with Time Commitment for Decentralized Governance: Bond Voting as a Sybil-Resistant Mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mohan, Vijay; Khezr, Peyman; Berg, Chris
• 署名单位: Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT); Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT)
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.01536
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: decentralized governance; Blockchain; time commitment; voting; Sybil resistance; plutocracy; bonds

摘要

In this paper, we examine the usefulness of time commitment as a voting resource for decentralized governance when the identity of voters cannot be verified. In order to do so, we take a closer look at two issues that confront token -based voting systems used by blockchain communities and organizations: voter fraud through the creation of multiple identities (Sybil attack) and concentration of voting power in the hands of the wealthy (plutocracy). Our contribution is threefold: first, we lay analytical foundations for the formal modeling of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a voting system to be resistant to a Sybil attack; second, we show that tokens as the only instrument for weighting votes cannot simultaneously achieve resistance to both Sybil attacks and a plutocracy in the voting process; and third, we design a voting mechanism, bond voting, that is Sybil resistant and offers a second instrument (time commitment) that is effective for countering plutocracy when large token holders also have a relatively high opportunity cost of locking tokens for a vote. Overall, our paper emphasizes the importance of time -based suffrage in decentralized governance.