Stable Matching on the Job? Theory and Evidence on Internal Talent Markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cowgill, Bo; Davis, Jonathan M. V.; Montagnes, B. Pablo; Perkowski, Patryk
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Oregon; Emory University; Yeshiva University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.01373
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: internal labor markets; assortative matching; assignment mechanisms; team formation; matching

摘要

A principal often needs to match agents to perform coordinated tasks, but agents can quit or slack off if they dislike their match. We study two prevalent approaches for matching within organizations: centralized assignment by firm leaders and self -organization through market -like mechanisms. We provide a formal model of the strengths and weaknesses of both methods under different settings, incentives, and production technologies. The model highlights trade-offs between match -specific productivity and job satisfaction. We then measure these trade-offs with data from a large organization's internal talent market. Firm -dictated matches are 33% more valuable than randomly assigned matches within job categories (using the firm's preferred metric of quality). By contrast, preference -based matches (using deferred acceptance) are only 5% better than random but are ranked (on average) about 38 percentiles higher by the workforce. The self -organized match is positively assortative and helps workers grow new skills; the firm's preferred match is negatively assortative and harvests existing expertise.