Frequent Reporting and Short-Termism: An Experimental Investigation

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Davis, Douglas; Cox, Caleb; Korenok, Oleg; Lightle, John
• 署名单位: Virginia Commonwealth University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.01955
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE; short-termism; laboratory experiments

摘要

Financial market regulators have long debated the appropriate frequency of mandatory corporate financial disclosures. Whereas frequent disclosures may help deter overinvestment, they may also encourage short-termism. This paper reports an experiment that examines the effects of varying reporting frequencies on managerial investment decisions. Experimental results indicate that frequent reporting modestly induces shorttermism, but it fails to reduce the overinvestment observed in the infrequent reporting regime. Nonbinding communication of intended investment plans does reduce overinvestment, but only in the infrequent reporting regime.