Consistent queueing rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Thomson, William; Velez, Rodrigo A.
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-5610
• DOI: 10.1007/s10107-022-01905-5
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 857-869
• 关键词: No-envy; allocation; economies; core

摘要

In a queueing problem , a group of agents are waiting for a service. Each agent incurs a cost of waiting that is proportional to the time they wait. Monetary transfers can take place. We study the subsolutions of the no-envy solution that are anonymous, consistent, conversely consistent, and continuous. We show that there are infinitely many proper consistent subsolutions from the no-envy solution and characterize a class of these solutions on the basis of basic requirements of continuity, anonymity, monotonicity with respect to the budget available, consistency, and the converse of consistency.