The core of a transferable utility game as the solution to a public good market demand problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Edelman, Paul H.; Van der Linden, Martin; Weymark, John A.
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University; Emory University; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-5610
• DOI: 10.1007/s10107-021-01729-9
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 687-702
• 关键词: pure theory

摘要

The core of a monotonic transferable utility (TU) game is shown to be the set of prices that incentivize each individual to demand the grand coalition in a market demand problem in which the goods being demanded are coalitions viewed as excluable public goods. It is also shown that the core is the intersection of superdifferentials evaluated at the grand coalition of the covers of person-specific TU games derived from the original game. These characterizations of the core demonstrate how a market demand approach to coalition formation in the spirit of Baldwin and Klemperer (Tropical geometry to analyze demand, University of Oxford, 2014; Econometrica, 87: 867-932, 2019) is related to the approach to the core using the cover of a TU game and it superdifferential at the grand coalition developed by Shapley and Shubik (J Econ Theory, 1: 9-25, 1969), Aubin (Math Oper Res, 6:1-13, 1981), and Danilov and Koshevoy (J Math Anal Appl, 247: 1-14, 2000).