Trading Volume Manipulation and Competition Among Centralized Crypto Exchanges

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Amiram, Dan; Lyandres, Evgeny; Rabetti, Daniel
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.02903
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: crypto exchanges; volume inflation; COMPETITION; information manipulation; regulation

摘要

How competition affects manipulation by firms of information about important attributes of their products and how such information manipulation impacts firms' shortterm and long-term performance are open empirical questions. We use a setting that is especially suitable for answering these questions-centralized crypto exchanges, on which information manipulation takes the form of inflated trading volume. We find that static and dynamic competition measures are positively associated with volume inflation, indicating that competition may lead to increased information manipulation. Exchanges that manipulate volume obtain short-run benefits but are punished in the long run, consistent with the trade-off between short-lived increases in rents and future losses because of damaged reputation.