New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Jennings, Andrew B.; Laraki, Rida; Puppe, Clemens; Varloot, Estelle M.
署名单位：
University of Liverpool; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
刊物名称：
MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
ISSN/ISSBN：
0025-5610
DOI：
10.1007/s10107-023-02010-x
发表日期：
2024
页码：
207-238
关键词：
摘要：
We provide novel representations of strategy-proof voting rules applicable when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences. In particular, we introduce a 'grading curve' representation which is particularly useful when introducing variable electorates. Our analysis recovers, links and unifies existing results in the literature, and provides new characterizations when strategy-proofness is combined with other desirable properties such as ordinality, participation, consistency, and proportionality. Finally, the new representations are used to compute the strategy-proof methods that maximize the ex-ante social welfare for the L2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$L_2$$\end{document}-norm and a uniform prior. The resulting strategy-proof welfare maximizer is the linear median (or 'uniform median'), that we also characterize as the unique proportional strategy-proof voting rule.
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