Can Socially Minded Governance Control the Artificial General Intelligence Beast?

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Gans, Joshua S.
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2024.05529
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: artificial general intelligence; existential risk; governance; social objectives

摘要

This paper robustly concludes that it cannot. A model is constructed under idealized conditions that presume that the risks associated with artificial general intelligence (AGI) are real, that safe AGI products are possible, and that there exist socially minded funders who are interested in funding safe AGI, even if this does not maximize profits. It is demonstrated that a socially minded entity formed by such funders would not be able to minimize harm from AGI that unrestricted products released by for-profit firms might create. The reason is that a socially minded entity can only minimize the use of unrestricted AGI products in ex post competition with for-profit firms at a prohibitive financial cost and so, does not preempt the AGI developed by for-profit firms ex ante.