Sometimes, Always, Never: Regulatory Clarity and the Development of Digital Financing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ran, Zhenkai; Rau, P. Raghavendra; Ziegler, Tania
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.01538
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Crowdfunding; LAW; INNOVATION; regulation; difference-in-difference analysis; GPT; AI in regulation analysis

摘要

This study examines how the level of detail in legal regulations impacts crowdfunding. We find that clear, explicit regulations significantly boost crowdfunding volumes in a global sample of digital finance. Using proxies to measure regulatory detail in three types of countries-countries that sometimes, always, or never had regulation-in a series of difference-in-difference regressions, we show a significant positive relation between regulatory clarity and the level of debt crowdfunding. There is little effect on the level of equity crowdfunding. Clear regulations appear to encourage the creation of new crowdfunding platforms rather than concentrating activity in existing ones.