Retailer-Led Marketplaces

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Hervas-Drane, Andres; Shelegia, Sandro
• 署名单位: Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.00315
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: assortment capacity; marketplace fees; product entry; Price competition; consumer steering

摘要

Leading retailers have opened up their online storefronts to competitors by operating marketplaces for third-party sellers. We develop a model of entry and price competition at the product market level to analyze the competitive interactions arising within these retailer-led marketplaces. We show that the retailer benefits from the marketplace by mitigating his own capacity constraints and manages competition from third-party sellers through his control of the storefront: by setting the marketplace fee, by steering consumers, and by allocating his own capacity in response to the product supply choices of third-party sellers. We draw managerial implications and examine policy interventions. We find that regulation of marketplace fees has the strongest potential to increase welfare outcomes. Our model provides novel insights into the mechanisms at play in retailer-led marketplaces and explains their prominent role in online retail.