Forced to be Active: Evidence from a Regulation Intervention

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Bjerksund, Petter; Orpetveit, Andreas; Sjuve, Andre Watto; Orpetveita, Andreas
• 署名单位: Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.03124
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: active portfolio management; Asset management; regulation of financial services

摘要

Mutual funds known as closet indexers are marketed as active but actually operate as low-activity funds. Investors end up paying for full service but receiving only a part of it. Supervisory authorities around the world are considering ways to regulate these funds. In this context, we examine the impact of regulatory interventions by Scandinavian regulators. We compare the scrutinized Scandinavian funds with similar unaffected European funds. The findings suggest that the regulated Scandinavian funds preferred increased activity over fee reduction. Consequently, fund managers adopted more active management strategies, resulting in a significant 2% decrease in annual alpha. Therefore, the regulatory interventions resulted in unfavorable outcomes for investors.