AN ANALYTICAL PROCESS MODEL OF 2-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: BALAKRISHNAN, PV; ELIASHBERG, J
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.41.2.226
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 226-243
• 关键词: games; NEGOTIATION PROCESSES; BUYER-SELLER INTERACTION

摘要

There has been a call to investigate the negotiation process (Gale 1986, Shubik 1982), as it is felt that this would yield important insights beyond those obtained by outcome-oriented theories (Roth 1979). This paper proposes a new analytical process model that captures both behavioral and economic aspects related to two-party negotiations. The proposed model, inspired by Pruitt's (1981) work, explicitly incorporates concepts which are both relevant and crucial, such as the negotiators' power, concession points, aspiration level, limit, and time pressure. Based on this process model, it is possible to predict (1) conditions under which agreements will not be reached despite the existence of a zone of agreement, (2) conditions under which agreements will be reached, and (3) the patterns of the negotiators' offers and counteroffers.