Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: Experimental comparison of alternative Dutch auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Katok, E; Roth, AE
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Harvard University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0254
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 1044-1063
• 关键词: Multiunit auctions; procurement auctions; Supply chain management; Experimental economics

摘要

Most business-to-business (B2B) auctions are used to transact large quantities of homogeneous goods, and therefore use multiunit mechanisms. In the B2B context, bidders often have increasing returns to scale, or synergies. We compare two commonly used auction formats for selling multiple homogeneous objects, both sometimes called Dutch auctions, in a set of value environments that include synergies and potentially subject bidders to the exposure and free-riding problems. We find that the descending-price auction, best known for its use in the Dutch flower auctions, is robust and performs well in a variety of environments, although there are some situations in which the ascending uniform-price auction similar to the one used by eBay better avoids the free-riding problem. We discuss the factors that influence each mechanism's performance in terms of the overall efficiency, the informational requirements, the seller's revenue, and the buyer's profit.