Bertrand supertraps

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cabral, LMB; Villas-Boas, M
• 署名单位: New York University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0313
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 599-613
• 关键词: competition; strategic complementarity; economies of scope; learning curves; core competencies; demand synergies; systems competition; compatibility; bundling; network effects; switching costs; durable goods; long-term contracts

摘要

We study oligopoly price competition between multiproduct firms-firms whose products interact in the profit function. Specifically, we focus on the impact of intrafirm product interactions on the level of equilibrium profits. This impact may be decomposed in two different ways: (a) a direct effect (keeping the competitors' actions fixed) plus a strategic effect (i.e., through the competitors' actions); or, alternatively, (b) a competitive advantage effect (change in firm i only) plus an imitation effect (change in all other firms). We derive conditions such that (a) the strategic effect more than outweighs the direct effect, and conditions such that (b) the imitation effect more than outweighs the competitive advantage effect: Bertrand supertraps. For example, an increase in the degree of economies of scope would increase profits if prices were fixed or if the change were limited to firm i's cost function. However, if all firms increase the degree of economies of scope then all firms receive lower profits. A variety of other applications is considered, including learning curves, core competencies, demand synergies, systems competition, compatibility bundling, network effects, switching costs, durable goods, long-term contracts.