Strategic Information Management Under Leakage in a Supply Chain

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anand, Krishnan S.; Goyal, Manu
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0930
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 438-452
• 关键词: application contexts/sectors; supply chain and logistics; competitive impacts of IS; economics of IS; Manufacturing; strategy

摘要

The importance of material. flow management for a profit-maximizing. firm has been well articulated in the supply chain literature. We demonstrate in our analytical model that a. firm must also actively manage information. flows within the supply chain, which translates to controlling what it knows, as well as what its competitors and suppliers know. In our model of horizontal competition between an informed and an uninformed. firm with a common upstream supplier, material and information. flows intersect through leakage of demand (order) information to unintended recipients. As a result, the informed. firm's drive to control information. flows within the supply chain can trigger operational losses through material. flow distortion. These losses can be so severe that the. firm may prefer not to acquire information even when it is costless to do so. Our results underscore the importance of strategic information management-actively managing the supply chain's information. flows, and making trade-offs with material. flows where appropriate, to maximize profits.