Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Taylor, Terry A.; Xiao, Wenqiang
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; New York University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1204
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1584-1598
• 关键词: supply chain contracting; asymmetric information; forecasting

摘要

This paper considers a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer that possesses superior demand-forecast information. We show that the manufacturer's expected profit is convex in the retailer's forecasting accuracy: The manufacturer benefits from selling to a better-forecasting retailer if and only if the retailer is already a good forecaster. If the retailer has poor forecasting capabilities, then the manufacturer is hurt as the retailer's forecasting capability improves. More generally, the manufacturer tends to be hurt (benefit) by improved retailer forecasting capabilities if the product economics are lucrative (poor). Finally, the optimal procurement contract is a quantity discount contract.