An Experimental Test of Advice and Social Learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Celen, Bogachan; Kariv, Shachar; Schotter, Andrew
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; New York University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1228
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1687-1701
• 关键词: Experiment; naive advice; social learning; word-of-mouth learning

摘要

Social learning describes any situation in which individuals learn by observing the behavior of others. In the real world, however, individuals learn not just by observing the actions of others but also from seeking advice. This paper introduces advice giving into the standard social-learning experiment of Celen and Kariv (Celen, B., S. Kariv. 2005. An experimental test of observational learning under imperfect information. Econom. Theory 26(3) 677-699). The experiments are designed so that both pieces of information-action and advice-are equally informative (in fact, identical) in equilibrium. Despite the informational equivalence of advice and actions, we find that subjects in a laboratory social-learning situation appear to be more willing to follow the advice given to them by their predecessor than to copy their action, and that the presence of advice increases subjects' welfare.