Competing Matchmakers: An Experimental Analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hossain, Tanjim; Minor, Dylan; Morgan, John
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Northwestern University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1407
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1913-1925
• 关键词: platform competition; Two-sided markets; monopoly; E-commerce

摘要

Platform competition is ubiquitous, yet platform market structure is little understood. Theory models typically suffer from equilibrium multiplicity-platforms might coexist or the market might tip to either platform. We use laboratory experiments to study the outcomes of platform competition. When platforms are primarily vertically differentiated, we find that even when platform coexistence is theoretically possible, markets inevitably tip to the more efficient platform. When platforms are primarily horizontally differentiated, so there is no single efficient platform, we find strong evidence of equilibrium coexistence.