Pooling, Access, and Countervailing Power in Channel Governance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hendrikse, George
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1369
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1692-1702
• 关键词: channel governance; Cooperatives; pooling; foreclosure; market power; incomplete contracts

摘要

Fruit and vegetable marketing organization the Greenery has experienced various governance structure changes, like horizontal merger, forward integration, and the emergence of grower associations. A multilateral incomplete contracting model is presented to account for these changes by analysing the interactions between pooling, access, and countervailing power. This model does not only explain the changes at the Greenery, but it contributes also to the design of efficient channel governance.