Selling to Strategic Consumers When Product Value Is Uncertain: The Value of Matching Supply and Demand

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Swinney, Robert
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1110.1360
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1737-1751
• 关键词: strategic consumer behavior; quick response; Consumer learning; pricing; Demand uncertainty

摘要

W e address the value of quick response production practices when selling to a forward-looking consumer population with uncertain, heterogeneous valuations for a product. Consumers have the option of purchasing the product early, before its value has been learned, or delaying the purchase decision until a time at which valuation uncertainty has been resolved. Whereas individual consumer valuations are uncertain ex ante, the market size is uncertain to the firm. The firm may either commit to a single production run at a low unit cost prior to learning demand, or commit to a quick response strategy that allows additional production after learning additional demand information. We find that the value of quick response is generally lower with strategic (forward-looking) customers than with nonstrategic (myopic) customers in this setting. Indeed, it is possible for a quick response strategy to decrease the profit of the firm, though whether this occurs depends on various characteristics of the market; specifically, we identify conditions under which quick response increases profit (when prices are increasing, when dissatisfied consumers can return the product at a cost to the firm) and conditions under which quick response may decrease profit (when prices are constant or when consumer returns are not allowed).