Corporate Strategy, Analyst Coverage, and the Uniqueness Paradox

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Litov, Lubomir P.; Moreton, Patrick; Zenger, Todd R.
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; Duke University; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1530
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1797-1815
• 关键词: corporate strategy; ANALYST COVERAGE; strategic uniqueness; diversification

摘要

In this paper, we argue that managers confront a paradox in selecting strategy. On one hand, capital markets systematically discount uniqueness in the strategy choices of firms. Uniqueness in strategy heightens the cost of collecting and analyzing information to evaluate a firm's future value. These greater costs in strategy evaluation discourage the collection and analysis of information regarding the firm, and result in a valuation discount. On the other hand, uniqueness in strategy is a necessary condition for creating economic ::ents and should, except for this information cost, be positively associated with firm value. We find empirical support for both propositions using a novel measure of strategy uniqueness in a firm panel data set between 1985 and 2007.