The Fragility of Commitment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morgan, John; Vardy, Felix
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; International Monetary Fund
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1639
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1344-1353
• 关键词: Cournot; bertrand; Stackelberg; Observation cost; value of commitment; first-mover advantage; Second-mover advantage; costly leader game

摘要

We show that the value of commitment is fragile in many standard games. When the follower faces a small cost to observe the leader's action, equilibrium payoffs are identical to the case where the leader's actions are unobservable. Applications of our result include standard Stackelberg-Cournot and differentiated product Bertrand games, as well as forms of indirect commitment, highlighted in Bulow et al. [Bulow J, Geanakoplos J, Klemperer P (1985) Multimarket oligopoly: Strategic substitutes and strategic complements. J. Political Econom. 93:488-511]. Weakening full rationality in favor of boundedly rational solution concepts such as quantal-response equilibrium restores the value of commitment.