Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution-An Experimental Investigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berger, Johannes; Harbring, Christine; Sliwka, Dirk
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1624
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 54-68
• 关键词: Performance measurement; forced distribution; forced ranking; motivation; experiment

摘要

A real-effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors are not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution system in which they have to assign differentiated grades. We find that productivity is significantly higher under a forced distribution by about 6% to 12%. However, the productivity effects are less clear cut when participants have prior experience with the baseline condition. Moreover, a forced distribution becomes detrimental when workers have access to a simple option to sabotage each other.