The Advertising Mix for a Search Good

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, Simon P.; Renault, Regis
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1575
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 69-83
• 关键词: persuasion game; Advertising; search; Content analysis; INFORMATION

摘要

We extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising. We model advertising as exciting consumer interest into learning more about the product, and determine a firm's equilibrium choice of advertising content over quality information, price information, and horizontal match information. Equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is necessary. The outcome is a separating equilibrium with quality unravelling. Lower-quality firms need to provide more information. For a given quality level, as a function of consumer visit costs, first quality information is disclosed, then price information and then horizontal product information are added to the advertising mix. Some suggestive evidence is provided from airline ads in newspapers.