Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brown, Jennifer; Minor, Dylan B.
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2014
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 3087-3102
• 关键词: elimination tournament; Dynamic contest; contest design; effort choice; betting markets

摘要

We consider how past, current, and future competition within an elimination tournament affect the probability that the stronger player wins. We present a two-stage model that yields the following main results: (1) a shadow effect wherein the stronger the expected future competitor, the lower the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage; and (2) an effort spillover effect wherein previous effort reduces the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage. We test our theory predictions using data from high-stakes tournaments. Empirical results suggest that shadow and spillover effects influence match outcomes and have already been priced into betting markets.