Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Assets Under Competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gallego, Guillermo; Hu, Ming
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1821
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1241-1259
• 关键词: revenue management; oligopoly; Dynamic pricing; open-loop; feedback strategy; differential game; stochastic game; Approximate Dynamic Programming

摘要

We study dynamic price competition in an oligopolistic market with a mix of substitutable and complementary perishable assets. Each firm has a fixed initial stock of items and competes in setting prices to sell them over a finite sales horizon. Customers sequentially arrive at the market, make a purchase choice, and then leave immediately with some likelihood of no purchase. The purchase likelihood depends on the time of purchase, product attributes, and current prices. The demand structure includes time-variant linear and multinomial logit demand models as special cases. Assuming deterministic customer arrival rates, we show that any equilibrium strategy has a simple structure, involving a finite set of shadow prices measuring capacity externalities that firms exert on each other: equilibrium prices can be solved from a one-shot price competition game under the current-time demand structure, taking into account capacity externalities through the time-invariant shadow prices. The former reflects the transient demand side at every moment, and the latter captures the aggregate supply constraints over the sales horizon. This simple structure sheds light on dynamic revenue management problems under competition, which helps capture the essence of the problems under demand uncertainty. We show that the equilibrium solutions from the deterministic game provide precommitted and contingent heuristic policies that are asymptotic equilibria for its stochastic counterpart, when demand and supply are sufficiently large.