Crowdsourcing with All-Pay Auctions: A Field Experiment on Taskcn

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liu, Tracy Xiao; Yang, Jiang; Adamic, Lada A.; Chen, Yan
• 署名单位: Tsinghua University; International Business Machines (IBM); IBM USA; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2013.1845
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 2020-2037
• 关键词: crowdsourcing; field experiment; All-pay auctions

摘要

To explore the effects of different incentives on crowdsourcing participation and submission quality, we conduct a randomized field experiment on Taskcn, a large Chinese crowdsourcing site using mechanisms with features of an all-pay auction. In our study, we systematically vary the size of the reward as well as the presence of a soft reserve, or early high-quality submission. We find that a higher reward induces significantly more submissions and submissions of higher quality. In comparison, we find that high-quality users are significantly less likely to enter tasks where a high-quality solution has already been submitted, resulting in lower overall quality in subsequent submissions in such soft reserve treatments.