Bonus Payments and Reference Point Violations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.1949
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1496-1513
• 关键词: reference points; bonus payments; job satisfaction; Job performance; TRANSPARENCY

摘要

We investigate how bonus payments affect the satisfaction and performance of managers in a large multinational company. We find that falling behind a natural reference standard for a fair bonus payment (a reference point violation) reduces satisfaction and subsequent performance. The effects are mitigated if information about one's relative standing toward the reference point is withheld. A model and a laboratory experiment provide complementary insights and additional robustness checks.