On the Failure of Hindsight-Biased Principals to Delegate Optimally

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Danz, David; Kuebler, Dorothea; Mechtenberg, Lydia; Schmid, Julia
• 署名单位: Technical University of Berlin; University of Hamburg
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2087
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1938-1958
• 关键词: hindsight bias; DELEGATION; experiments

摘要

With the help of a simple model, we show that the hindsight bias can lead to inefficient delegation decisions. This prediction is tested experimentally. In an online experiment that was conducted during the FIFA World Cup 2010, participants were asked to predict a number of outcomes of the ongoing World Cup and had to recall their assessments after the outcomes had been realized. Their answers were used to construct individual measures of the hindsight bias. The participants also had to make choices in a delegation game. Our data confirm that hindsight-biased subjects more frequently fail to delegate optimally than subjects whom we have classified as not hindsight biased.