Entry and Subcontracting in Public Procurement Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Branzoli, Nicola; Decarolis, Francesco
• 署名单位: European Central Bank; Bank of Italy; Boston University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2071
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 2945-2962
• 关键词: procurement; auctions; entry; Subcontracting; difference-in-differences

摘要

We empirically study how the interplay between entry and subcontracting choices is affected by the use of different auction formats in public procurement. The difference-in-differences strategy used exploits a data set of auctions for public works run alternately under first price and average bid auctions. We find that the use of first price auctions causes a marked decline in both entry and subcontracting. We also find that the type of firms entering first price auctions changes with firms becoming more likely to bid jointly with other firms in ad hoc joint ventures.