Collusion in Dynamic Buyer-Determined Reverse Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fugger, Nicolas; Katok, Elena; Wambach, Achim
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2142
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 518-533
• 关键词: bidding; procurement; reverse auctions; multiattribute auctions; Behavioral game theory; Experimental economics

摘要

Although binding reverse auctions have attracted a good deal of interest in the academic literature, in practice, dynamic nonbinding reverse auctions are the norm in procurement. In those, suppliers submit price quotes and can respond to quotes of their competitors during a live auction event. However, the lowest quote does not necessarily determine the winner. The buyer decides after the contest, taking further supplier information into account, on who will be awarded the contract. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that this bidding format enables suppliers to collude, thus leading to noncompetitive prices.