When 3+1 > 4: Gift Structure and Reciprocity in the Field

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gilchrist, Duncan S.; Luca, Michael; Malhotra, Deepak
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2275
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 2639-2650
• 关键词: economics; behavior and behavioral decision making; microeconomic behavior; LABOR; IT policy and management; electronic commerce; electronic markets and auctions; organizational studies; motivation-incentives

摘要

Do higher wages elicit reciprocity and lead to increased productivity? In a field experiment with 266 employees, we find that paying higher wages, per se, does not have a discernible effect on productivity in a context with no future employment opportunities. However, structuring a portion of the wage as a clear and unexpected gift-by offering an unconditional raise after the employee has accepted the contract-leads to higher productivity for the duration of the job. Gifts are roughly as efficient as hiring more workers.