Market Design and Moral Behavior

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kirchler, Michael; Huber, Juergen; Stefan, Matthias; Sutter, Matthias
• 署名单位: University of Innsbruck; University of Gothenburg; University of Cologne; University of Innsbruck
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2246
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 2615-2625
• 关键词: morals; market design; experiment; behavioral economics; PUNISHMENT

摘要

In an experiment with 739 subjects, we study whether and how different interventions might have an influence on the degree of moral behavior when subjects make decisions that can generate negative externalities on uninvolved parties. Particularly, subjects can either take money for themselves or donate it to UNICEF for measles vaccines. By considering two fairly different institutional regimes-one with individual decision making, one with a double-auction market-we expose the different interventions to a kind of robustness check. We find that the threat of monetary punishment promotes moral behavior in both regimes. Getting subjects more involved with the traded good has no effect, though, in both regimes. Only the removal of anonymity, thus making subjects identifiable, has different effects across regimes, which we explain by different perceptions of responsibility.